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CIVIL RIGHTS 
EVOLUTION OF THE HOSTILE WORKPLACE 
CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII: 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
ONLY SENSITIVE MEN 
NEED APPLY. 
In Ellison u. Brady 1, ("Ellison"), a panel of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered three questions regarding hostile 
workplace sexual harassment claims that had not previously 
been addressed in the Circuit.2 The Court first considered the 
question of what level of conduct was necessary to support a 
hostile workplace claim, holding that the plaintiff need not have 
suffered any actual psychological harm, but that it was enough 
that the complained-of conduct was sufficiently "severe and per-
vasive" that it had unreasonably altered the terms and con-
ditions of employment. 3 The Court then turned to the question 
of how the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct should be 
determined. The Court held that in determining whether there 
was in fact an actionably hostile workplace, courts must review 
the challenged conduct from the perspective of a reasonable 
member of the class of persons to which the victim belongs.4 In 
what is the most widely publicized aspect of the opinion,6 the 
Court held that the sued-upon conduct in hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment cases had to be viewed from the 
perspective of a "reasonable woman."6 
The Court also held that the reasonableness of an employ-
er's response to sexual harassment in the workplace depends 
1. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (per Beezer, J., with whom 
Kozinski, J., joined; Stephens, J., Senior United States District Judge for the Central 
District of California, sitting by designation, dissenting). 
2. Id. at 875-76. 
3. Id. at 876-78. 
4. Id. at 878. 
5. E.g., Business Week, Oct. 28, 1991, at 30; Time, Oct. 21, 1991, at 52; U.S. News 
& World Report, Nov. 18, 1991, at 30. 
6. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79. 
69 
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on the response's ability not just to end the particular harass-
ment, but to assure a workplace free from sexual harassment.7 
In what may be the part of the case with the most wide-
ranging implications for employers and employees alike, the 
Court specifically held that in order to avoid liability, employ-
ers may be required to fire those employees whose mere pres-
ence creates a hostile work environment.8 
II. FACTS 
Kerry Ellison ("Ellison") and Sterling Gray ("Gray") were 
co-workers at the IRS office in San Mateo, California.9 Gray 
invited Ellison to lunch, during which they stopped at Gray's 
house to retrieve his son's forgotten lunch.10 Afterwards, Gray 
began to hang around Ellison's desk unnecessarily.11 Ellison 
declined his next invitation because she was uncomfortable 
being alone with him.12 When she received a strange note from 
Gray at work,13 Ellison became frightened and showed the 
note to their supervisor, who called the note "sexual harass-
ment. "14 Ellison asked the supervisor not take any action and, 
in an effort to handle the situation herself, asked a male co-
worker to tell Gray to leave her alone. 16 
A few days later, Ellison left for a training session in St. 
Louis. While there, she received a second letter from Gray.18 On 
her return to San Mateo, Ellison requested that either she or 
7. [d. at 882. 
8. [d. at 883. 
9. Ellison v. Brady. 924 F.2d 872. 873 (9th Cir. 1991). They were not friends and 
did not work closely. [d. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. at 874. 
13. The note read: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. 1 have 
never been in such constant term oil (sic). Thank you for talking with me. 1 could not 
stand to feel your hatred for another day." Ellison. 924 F.2d at 874. 
[d. 
14. [d. 
15. [d. 
16. This letter read. in part: 
"I know that you are worth knowing with or without 
sex .... Leaving aside the hassles and disasters of recent 
weeks. 1 have enjoyed you so much over these past few 
months. Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away. 
Admiring your style and elan .... Don·t you think it odd that 
two people who have never even talked together. alone. are 
striking off such intense sparks ... 1 will [write] another let-
ter in the near future." 
2
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Gray be transferred to another IRS office. 17 The supervisor told 
Gray not to contact Ellison, and Gray voluntarily transferred 
to the San Francisco office. 18 Three weeks later, Gray filed a 
union grievance, seeking to return to San Mateo. 19 When 
Ellison learned of Gray's efforts to return, she filed a formal 
complaint with the IRS and obtained permission to tem-
porarily transfer to San Francisco upon Gray's return to San 
Mateo. 2o . 
The IRS employee investigating Ellison's complaint, like 
Ellison's supervisor, found that Gray's conduct amounted to sex-
ual harassment.21 In reviewing that determination, however, 
the Treasury Department held that Ellison's complaint did 
not involve a pattern or practice covered by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations. 22 On 
administrative appeal by Ellison, the EEOC affirmed this 
decision on the alternate ground that the IRS took adequate 
measures to prevent future harassment.23 
Ellison then sued the Secretary of the Treasury under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary because 
Ellison failed to state a prima facie case of sexual 
harassment.25 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit conducted a de 
novo review28 and reversed the district court's decision. 27 
17.Id. 
18. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 874. 
19. Id. The IRS and the union agreed that Gray could return to San Mateo 
after a total of six months at the San Francisco office, if he promised to leave Ellison 
alone.ld. 
20. Id. Meanwhile, Gray sent a third letter, holding the idea that Ellison and Gray 
had a relationship. It is not clear that Ellison received this letter. Id. at 874-75 n.2. 
21. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875. 
22. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982). The EEOC is the agency charged with 
enforcing Title VII. Id. 
23. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875. 
24. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982), which reads: MIt shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment bec~use of such indiv-
idual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
25. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875. 
26. Id. at 873 (citing Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988). The 
grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, and the evidence is viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 1320). 
27. Id. at 883. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
Id. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AS DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employ-
ers from discriminating against employees on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.28 The inclusion of 
sex-based discrimination in Title VII was made at the last 
minute, and there is, accordingly, little legislative history 
relating to sex-based discrimination. 29 In early cases asserting 
claims for workplace sexual harassment, the courts did not rec-
ognize sexual harassment as a form of discrimination prohi-
bited by Title VII. 30 In Corne and De Vane v. Bausch & Lomb,31 
for example, the court held that sexual advances were not 
discrimination in violation of Title VII because the harasser was 
satisfying a "personal urge," not serving any employer policy.32 
Similar conduct was also held non-actionable in Miller v. Bank 
of America33 because the court found the harassment was "iso-
lated" and not the result of a company policy imposing or per-
mitting consistent sex-based discrimination.54 
Sexual harassment was first recognized as discrimination 
prohibited under Title VII in Williams v. Saxbe. 36 Williams 
held that a supervisor's retaliation against a female employ-
ee for refusing sexual advances is prohibited sex discrimi-
nation.36 The Fourth Circuit later held that a supervisor's 
sexual advances, along with the existence of a practice so per-
vasive as to constitute a de facto company policy of compelling 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). See infra note 24 for the text of this statute. 
29. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 67, 63-64 (1986) (citing 110 CONGo 
REC. 2,677-84 (1964». 
30. E.g., Come and DeVane V. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1976), 
vacated and remanded, 662 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1977); Miller V. Bank of America, 418 F. 
Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
31. 390 F. Supp. at 162. (Alleging repeated verbal and physical sexual advances 
by male supervisor). 
32. [d. at 163. 
33. 418 F. Supp at 234. (Alleging male supervisor dismissed female employee for 
refusing sexual advances). 
34. [d. at 236. 
35. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 687 F.2d 1240 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). On remand, the trial court held that submission to supervisor's advances 
was a term of employment in violation of Title VII. Williams V. Civiletti, 487 F. 
Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980~ 
36. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 662-63. 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/9
1992] CIVIL RIGHTS 73 
employees to submit to sexual advances, violated Title VII in 
Garber v. Saxon Business Products. 37 Shortly thereafter, in 
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas,38 the Third Circuit 
held that a supervisor's conditioning further employment on 
submission to his sexual demands violated Title VII.39 In these 
cases, the courts recognized that harassment keyed to con-
tinuing employment and/or promotion fell within the definition 
of sex discrimination, but did not consider whether other 
forms of sexual harassment might also violate Title VII. 
In 1980, the EEOC promulgated regulations ("the 
Guidelines") recognizing that sexual harassment falls within 
the definition of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.40 
The Guidelines define sexual harassment as "unwelcome sex-
ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature. "41 The guidelines recognize 
two categories of sexual harassment.42 The first, quid pro quo 
harassment, occurs when terms of employment are condi-
tioned on submission to sexual harassment.43 The second, hos-
tile work environment harassment, occurs where unwelcome 
sexual conduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment."« 
After the promulgation of the EEOC Guidelines, courts began 
to recognize hostile work environment harassment as action-
able sex discrimination. 
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held in Bundy v. Jackson46 that under the Guidelines, 
constant sexual propositions, without direct threat of adverse 
job-related consequences for refusal, was prohibited sex 
discrimination.48 The Bundy court extended Title VII protection 
37. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). (Alleging discharge for refusing male super-
visor's sexual advances). 
38. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). (Alleging employment conditioned on submis-
sion to sexual advances). 
39. Id. at 1048-49. 
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a) (1990). 
41. Id. 
42. See generally C. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47 
(1979) for a discussion of quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harass-
ment. 
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1), (2) (1990). 
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a) (3) (1990). 
45. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
46. Id. at 946. 
5
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to harassment victims who suffer no economic harm in con-
nection with the harassment in order to prevent employers from 
allowing sexual harassment and yet avoiding Title VIIliabil-
ity by "carefully stopping short of' taking steps to cause the 
employee economic detriment.47 The Eleventh Circuit relied on 
Bundy and the Guidelines in Henson v. City of Dundee. 48 The 
court held that sexual harassment creating a hostile work 
environment violates Title VII where the plaintiff proves that 
she belongs to a protected group and was subject to unwelcome 
sex-based harassment which affected a "term, condition, or 
privilege of employment. "49 The Fourth Circuit also recognized 
the viability of hostile environment claims in Katz v. Dole. 60 
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 61 the United States 
Supreme Court held that hostile work environment sexual 
harassment can amount to sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII. 62 In so holding, the Court looked to race and nation-
al origin cases which found that actions by the employer which 
create a hostile work environment are prohibited under Title 
VIps The Court also found persuasive the statement in the 
Guidelines that harassment resulting in noneconomic injury 
can violate Title VII.64 Further, the Court held that sexual 
harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment. "66 The Court quickly concluded, 
without elaboration, that in the case before it the harasser's 
alleged conduct, which included rape, met the "sufficiently 
severe or pervasive" test.66 While the Court did not provide spe-
cific guidance on how a hostile work environment claim was to 
be proven, it nonetheless held definitively that once such a 
47. [d. at 945. 
48. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
49. [d. at 903-04. 
50. 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). (Alleging co-worker sexual harassment cre-
ated hostile work environment). 
51. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
52. [d. at 67. 
53. [d. at 66. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 406 U.S. 975 (1972) (Discriminatory services to Hispanic clientele); Firefighters 
Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied Bub nom., Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977) (Prohibiting racially seg-
regated supper clubs). 
54. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a) (3) (1990). 
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,904 
(11th Cir. 1982». 
56. [d. 
6
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claim was proven, the plaintiff had a cause of action under Title 
VII, and that no economic loss need be shown by the plaintiff.57 
B. DETERMINING WHEN CONDUCT CREATES A HOSTILE WORK 
ENVIRONMENT 
Not all sexual harassment creates an actionable hostile 
work environment.68 The Court in Meritor held that a hostile 
work environment claim has three elements: (1) the plaintiff 
must have been subjected to "sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, [or] other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature;"69 (2) the conduct must have been unwelcome;60 and (3) 
the conduct must have been sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter employment conditions and create an abusive work 
environment.61 The focus of the courts in most hostile envi-
ronment claims has been on the third element, specifically, how 
to determine whether conduct is "sufficiently severe or per-
vasive" to create a hostile work environment. A primary point 
of contention in this regard has been over whose perspective 
courts should consider in measuring the severity and pervasive-
ness of the complained -of conduct. 82 
According to the EEOC, no single factor determines whether 
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive as to violate Title VII. 
Rather, the EEOC looks to the totality of the circumstances in 
making this determination.63 A pattern of harassment gener-
ally creates a stronger hostile environment claim than an iso-
lated incident.54 However, because employees need not subject 
themselves to extended periods of harassment to receive Title 
VII protection, courts should, according to the EEOC, consid-
er the conduct's degree of offensiveness.66 The EEOC suggests 
that the challenged conduct be evaluated from the objective 
57. [d. at 67-68. 
58. See [d. at 67; Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 (Mere utterance of racial epithet not 
violation). 
59. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990». 
60. [d. at 68. Whether the plaintifTvoluntarily submitted to sexual advances is 
irrelevant; courts must focus on whether the plaintiff indicated that sexual advances 
were unwelcome. [d. However, a plaintiffs provocative speech and dress are relevant 
in determining whether she found the alleged conduct unwelcome. [d. at 69. 
61. [d. at 67. 
62. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text for discussion. 
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1990). 
64. EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Employment Practices 
Manual (BNA) 405:6681, 6690 (March 19, 1990). 
65. [d. 
7
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perspective of a reasonable person to avoid employer liability 
for the complaints of hyper-sensitive employees.86 The EEOC 
also notes that because seemingly harmless conduct may 
nevertheless create a hostile work environment, the "reason-
ableness" standard should consider the victim's perspective and 
ignore "stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior. "67 
Prior to Ellison, the Ninth Circuit had not had to consider 
the standard for evaluating the nature or extent of the conduct 
necessary to support a hostile work environment claim. Hostile 
work environment cases had only been before the Ninth Circuit 
on three occasions. In Jordan v. Clark86 and Vasconcelos v. 
Meese,69 the only issue before the Court was whether the 
District Court's factual findings against the plaintiff were 
clearly erroneous and, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous because the 
plaintiff's testimony was properly disbelieved; thus, the Courts 
had no occasion to reach the issue of what was actionable con-
duct. 70 In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
Hacienda Hotel,71 the Ninth Circuit held, without discussion, 
that a hostile work environment existed where women employ-
ees were repeatedly subjected to sexual vulgarities and requests 
for sexual favors. 72 
The question of what kind of conduct was actionable had, 
however, been addressed in several other Circuits prior to 
Ellison. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining CO.78, the Sixth Circuit 
held that conduct creates a hostile work environment where it 
would interfere with a reasonable person's work performance 
AND seriously affect the reasonable person's psychological well-
being. 74 Additionally, the Court held that a plaintiff must 
prove that she was actually offended and injured by the alleged 
conduct.76 The existence of a hostile work environment depends, 
66. 1d. at 6689. 
67. 1d. at 6690. 
68. 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. cknied sub nom., Jordan V. Hodel, 488 U.S. 
1066 (1989). 
69. 907 F.2d III (9th Cir. 1990). 
70. Jordan, 847 F.2d at 1375; Vasconcelos, 907 F.2d at 112. 
71. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989). 
72. 1d. at 1515. 
73. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. cknied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
74. 1d. at 620. However, Justice Keith's dissent urged adoption of the reasonable 
woman perspective. 1d. at 626. 
75. 1d. at 620. 
8
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the Sixth Circuit held, on the objective and subjective circum-
stances of each case, including the nature of the harassment, 
the backgrounds of the plaintiff and her co-workers and super-
visors, the physical environment of the workplace, the level of 
obscenity in the workplace and plaintiff's reasonable expec-
tations in accepting employment.76 
In Brooms v. Regal Tube CO.,77 the Seventh Circuit also 
used a standard which considered both objective and subjective 
factors, but did not require Rabidue's strict finding of a seri-
ous effect on the plaintiff's psychological well-being. Brooms 
held that harassment was actionably severe or pervasive when 
it would "adversely affect both a reasonable person and the par-
ticular plaintiff. "78 The Seventh Circuit applied an objective 
"reasonable person" test and, at the same time, considered the 
harassment's actual effect on the plaintiff. 
While accepting the objective/subjective test generally, the 
Third Circuit modified the objective aspect of that test in 
Andrews v. City ofPhiladelphia.79 Rather than judging alleged 
harassment from the perspective of the apparently gender 
neutral "reasonable person" used in Rabidue and Brooms, the 
court held that sexual harassment which would "detri-
mentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that posi-
tion" creates a hostile work environment. so In adopting this vic-
tim-oriented perspective, the court focused first on 
Congressional intent in enacting Title VII, which it found to be 
"'the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers 
to employment ... .'''81 The court found that the principle 
76. Id. at 620-21 
[Ijt cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environ-
ments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. 
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines 
may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this. 
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court 
mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity 
for the female workers of America. But it is quite different 
to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magi-
cal transformation in the social mores of American workers. 
Id. (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 
1984». 
77. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). 
78. Id. at 419. Accord Kingv. Board of Regents ofUniv. of Wis. System, 898 F.2d 
533,537 (7th Cir. 1990). 
79. 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
80.Id. 
81. Id. at 1483 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971». 
9
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barrier facing women was the fact that the mere existence of 
harassment deters women from "joining the work force or 
accepting certain jobs. "82 Adjudging the impropriety of the 
allegedly harassing conduct from a woman's perspective 
ensures that the barriers are removed and that women are 
allowed to engage in "self-respecting employment."83 The Court 
also stated that the "reasonableness" element of the test pro-
tects employers from liability for the reactions of hyper-sen-
sitive employees. 84 The gender-specific aspect of the test 
recognizes that men and women have different perceptions of 
what type of conduct may amount to sexual harassment.86 
Ellison was the first case in the Ninth Circuit to consider 
the standard by which to determine whether conduct was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work envi-
ronment, and had the divergent views of other circuits, dis-
cussed above, from which to choose. 
C. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Meritor touched briefly on the question of employer liabil-
ity, but noted that its discussion had "a rather abstract qual-
ity about it given the state of the record."8B Although the issue 
had been extensively briefed by the parties, as well as the 
EEOC as amicus curiae, the Court expressly declined to set out 
any definite rules on employer liability in hostile work envi-
ronment cases.87 However, the Court did give some indications 
of its thoughts on the matter in dicta. 
In Meritor, where the harasser was a supervisor, the Court 
distinguished between quid pro quo harassment and hostile 
workplace harassment for purposes of employer liability. In 
quid pro quo cases, the Court stated that liability should be 
determined under traditional agency principals,88 and that if 
82.Id. 
83.Id. 
84. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483. 
85. Id. at 1485-86 (quoting Bennett v. Coroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 
(5th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1988) and citing Note, Sexual Harassment 
Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VI/, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1984). 
Women often perceive workplace conduct as sexually harassing, while men perceive 
the same conduct as harmless and innocent. Id. at 1451). 
86. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
87.Id. 
88. Id. at 70 (quoting brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 22). 
10
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the offending supervisor exercised actual or apparent author-
ity granted by the employer in making or threatening to make 
employment decisions depend on or relating to the supervisor's 
sexual harassment, then the employer would be held liable even 
if the employer had neither actual nor constructive notice of the 
wrongful conduct.S9 
In contrast, the Court stated that the employer's liability 
was not to be determined by agency principles in hostile 
workplace cases.90 Instead, the inquiry would focus first on 
whether the employer had "an expressed policy against sex-
ual harassment and had implemented a procedure specifi-
cally designed to resolve sexual harassment claims. "91 If such 
a program is in place and the employee fails to avail herself 
of the remedies provided, then, the Court indicated, the 
employer would be "shielded from liability absent actual 
knowledge [by the employer] of the sexually hostile environ-
ment .... "92 However, the Court promptly disclaimed the 
notion that the existence of an expressed policy against sex-
ual harassment and a grievance procedure was, without more, 
enough for an employer to avoid liability. Instead, the Court 
said that if the grievance procedure was not reasonably "calcu-
lated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward,"93 
then the employee's failure to avail herself of those procedures 
would not bar her claim.94 
Again, it should be noted that Meritor involved harass-
ment by a supervisor, not a co-worker.96 Generally, the EEOC 
and courts hold that employers are liable for sexual harassment 
among co-workers "where the employer ... knows or should 
have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took 
immediate and appropriate corrective action."98 An employer's 
knowledge of sexual harassment is shown where complaints are 
made to the employer or where the harassment is particular-
ly pervasive, the employer may be charged with constructive 
knowledge.9? Additionally, liability has been imputed where 
89. [d. 
90. [d. at 71 (quoting brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26). 
91. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 73. 
94. [d. at 72. 
95. [d. at 59. 
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(d) (1990). 
97. Katz, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983). 
11
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employers anticipated or should have reasonably anticipated 
sexual harassment and failed to take actions reasonably cal-
culated to prevent its occurrence.98 
Courts have also addressed an issue not mentioned at all 
in Meritor: the circumstances under which an employer is 
liable for its response to complaints of sexual harassment 
when an employee makes a complaint of sexual harassment 
and/or when the employer is charged with constructive notice 
of particularly pervasive harassment. The rule that evolved in 
that connection was that upon actual or constructive notice of 
sexual harassment, employers must take prompt remedial 
action to avoid Title VII liability.99 Remedies must be propor-
tionate to the seriousness of the offense. loo One court rejected 
the argument that the complained-of incidents of sexual harass-
ment warranted dismissal of the offender. lol Another court 
held that if an employer's response to sexual harassment was 
"reasonably calculated to end the harassment," liability should 
generally not be imposed, even though the employer's response 
was unsuccessful. 102 Swentek v. USAIR Inc. 103 provides an exam-
ple of "immediate and appropriate corrective action" where, fol-
lowing a complaint, the harasser was given a written warning 
to refrain from using foul language and informed that any 
further complaint would lead to suspension. l04 Also, where an 
employee had previously engaged in severe sexual harass-
ment, thereafter, his mere presence in the workplace may cre-
ate a hostile work environment. l06 
98. Paroline v. UNISYS Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 107 (4th Cir. 1989) rehearing en banc 
granted, vacated in part on other grounds 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (Employer lia-
bility from knowledge of previous harassment). 
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1990). See also Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. 
100. Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1987). The 
employer's remedial action was ·unusually prompt- where the harassment occurred 
for two days before the company president assured the plaintiff that she would not work 
with the offender after the following day. [d. at 309. 
101. Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984). Reprimanding, 
placing on 90 days probation and warning the offender that further sexual harassment 
would result in discharge was sufficient remedial action. [d. at 427. 
102. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256 (Policy against sexual harassment, including semi-
nars on the subject for supervisors, insufficient response to sexual harassment). See 
also Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989). (Look at success and 
reasonableness of response). 
103. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987). 
104. [d. at 558. 
105. See Paroline v. UNISYS Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1989), rehear-
ing en bane granted, vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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IV. THE ELLISON COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE LEVEL OF CONDUCT THAT CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION 
Ellison represented the first occasion for the Ninth Circuit 
to consider several aspects of hostile workplace claims.106 The 
first of these was what conduct would give rise to a hostile 
workplace claim.107 Specifically, the Ellison court had to give def-
inition to an element of sexual harassment claims that had been 
stated in broad terms by Meritor: the requirement that the chal-
lenged conduct be sufficiently "severe and pervasive" to either 
unreasonably interfere with an individual's work performance 
or create a hostile employment environment. 106 The severity and 
pervasiveness test on its face requires looking to both the 
quality and the quantity of the conduct involved. In formulating 
its analytical framework, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
required showing of severity varies inversely with the 
pervasiveness. 109 It also noted that the trial court had made its 
decision without any controlling precedent concerning con-
duct such as Gray's, which fell "somewhere between forcible 
rape and the mere utterance of an epithet. "110 
The District Court had found that Gray's conduct was "iso-
lated and genuinely trivial."111 The Secretary of the Treasury 
urged the Ninth Circuit to affirm that result, and in doing so 
to adopt the analysis in two cases which found no Title VII vio-
lation on behavior more egregious than Gray's. 112 Scott v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. held that a plaintiff must feel "anxiety and 
debilitation" sufficient to "poison" her working environment to 
support a claim.l13 Rabidue required a showing that the 
106. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1991). 
107. Id. at 877-78. 
108. Id. at 878-81. 
109. Id. at 878 (citing Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 
(11th Cir. 1989) (Hostile work environment where noose hung over employee's work 
station twice». 
110. Id. at 877 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60, 67). 
111. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. 
112. Id. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (No hos-
tile work environment where repeatedly propositioned, winked at, offered a rub-
down, asked "what will I get for it?" in response to requests for advice, slapped on the 
buttocks, and told probably moans and groans during sex); Rabidue v. Osceola 
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,622 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (No 
hostile work environment where routine sexual vulgarities and pictures of scantily clad 
women throughout office). 
113. Scott, 798 F.2d at 619. 
13
Hahn: Civil Rights
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
82 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:69 
reasonable person's psychological well-being would have been 
seriously and adversely affected by the alleged conduct. u4 
The Ninth Circuit rejected both Scott and Rabidue and 
reversed the trial court's finding in the case before it for two 
reasons. ll6 First, the court found that Title VII provides employ-
ees with protection before their psychological well-being is 
actually harmed by sex discrimination. U6 More important, the 
standards used in Scott and Rabidue concentrate on the sever-
ity of the effect on the victim, but it is the conduct itself, not 
its effect, that is the focus of Title VII.ll7 
B. THE GAUGE BY WHICH TO MEASURE CONDUCT 
Having defined the kind of conduct that was actionable, the 
court then had to decide the standard by which to measure the 
conduct involved. Some cases had stated that the conduct had 
to be assessed using the classic "reasonable person" approach 
of tort law. uB Another court had held that the conduct should 
be measured from the perspective of a "reasonable member of 
the same sex. "119 The Ellison court adopted the latter view, hold-
ing that the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment 
must be determined from the perspective of the victim. 120 
Elliso~ reasoned that courts must acknowledge that the per-
spectives held by men and women concerning appropriate sex-
ual conduct are disparate. 121 Women share concerns about 
sexual conduct not generally held by men122 and may find 
conduct offensive which men generally find appropriate. 123 
114. Rabidue, 805 r.2d at 619. 
115. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78. 
116. Id. See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Employment 
Practices Manual (BNA) 405:6681, 6690, n.20 (March, 19 1990). 
117. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78. 
118. E.g., Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
119. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
120. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. The reasonable person standard may reinforce dis-
criminatory conduct considered acceptable by some. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 879. See Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of 
Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. L. REV. 1183 (1989). Vulnerability to sexual coercion can 
make women wary of sexual encounters. Women tend to have more restrictive views 
on the appropriateness of sexual conduct. Id. at 1205; Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 
Uniform Crime Reports for 1988 at 16 (l989) (73 of every 100,000 females reported rape 
victims, 1988). 
123. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79 (citing Lipsett v. Univ. ofP.R., 864 F.2d 881 (let 
Cir. 1988). "[T]he man may not realize his conduct is offensive and the woman may 
14
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Therefore, the court must look solely to the perspective of a per-
son of the victim's gender; a female plaintiff'24 states a viable 
hostile environment claim if she proves that a "reasonable 
woman" would consider the alleged conduct sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter work conditions and create an abusive 
working environment. 126 The Court held that a reasonable 
woman could find Gray's conduct sufficiently severe and per-
vasive to create an abusive work environment and remanded 
the case for trial under that standard.126 
C. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR INADEQUATE RESPONSES TO CHARGES 
OF HARASSMENT 
Finally, the Court turned to the question of liability aris-
ing from the employer's response to claims of sexual harass-
ment. The Ellison court agreed with the Fourth Circuit's 
holding that an employer's response must be reasonably calcu-
lated to end the harassment. 127 However, Ellison went fur-
ther and stated that the reasonableness of an employer's 
response is dependent not just on actually stopping the par-
ticular harassment; employer penalties must also ultimately 
be geared towards assuring a workplace free from sexual 
harassment. 128 In evaluating employer responses, courts must 
also consider the remedy's ability to deter others from engag-
ing in similar conduct. 129 In failing to discipline Gray, the 
court inferred that the IRS sent a message to potential 
harassers that they would not be disciplined. 130 
be fearful of criticizing her supervisor." Id. at 898). See Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 
630 (6th Cir. 1987). "We recognize that men and women are vulnerable in different 
ways and offended by different behavior." Id. at 637 n.2; Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths 
and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law 99 YALE 
L.J. 1177 (1990). Men "tend to view 'milder' forms of harassment, such as suggestive 
looks, repeated requests for dates, and sexist jokes, as harmless social interactions 
.... " Id. at 1207-08. 
124. The court noted that in cases where a man is the sexual harassment victim, 
a reasonable man standard applies. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 n.ll. 
125. Id. at 879. The court explained that the reasonable woman standard does 
not give women more protection than men. Instead, it counterbalances the regular fail-
ure to acknowledge the experiences of women. Id. Cf, State v. Wanrow, Wash.2d 
221,239-241,559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (1977) (en bane) (reasonable woman standard for 
self defense). 
126. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. 
127. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 
1983». 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 882. See also 29 C.F.R. §1604.ll(f) (1990) "Prevention is the best tool 
for the elimination of sexual harassment." Id. 
15
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The Ellison court also held that employers may well have 
to do more than simply ask offenders to refrain from further 
harassment. lSI Instead, employers may have to remove from the 
workplace, either by transfer or if necessary, termination, 
those employees whose mere presence would create a hostile 
work environment for the reasonable woman;IS2 otherwise, the 
harassment has not been eliminated, and the message that the 
employer is serious about eliminating sexual harassment is not 
effective. ISS The Court stated that the IRS did not sufficiently 
consider Ellison's interest in failing to try and determine the 
impact of Gray's presence at the office on Ellison. lS4 Further, a 
six month separation may have been minimal punishment in 
relation to the nature of Gray's conduct. lSG 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. ELLISON'S FOCUS ON CONDUCT, RATHER THAN THE DEGREE OF 
INJURY CAUSED BY THE CONDUCT, COMPORTS WITH THE INTENT 
UNDERLYING TITLE VII. 
In considering the level of severity and pervasiveness nec-
essary to state a sexual harassment claim under a hostile 
work environment theory, the Ellison court expressly rejected 
the reasoning of two cases which had required the plaintiff to 
show that the conduct was of a kind and degree that it would 
cause a reasonable person either such severe "anxiety and 
debilitation" that the workplace was "poisoned" or that the con-
duct would "affect seriously the psychological well-being" of a 
reasonable person. ISS Ellison's rejection of that reasoning was 
well-taken. The flaw in Scott and Rabidue is that they focus on 
the injury caused, not the conduct itself. Rabidue directly 
enunciates what is implicit in both decisions: the supposition 
131. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. The IRS did not express strong disapproval of Gray's 
conduct, reprimand, put him on probation, or inform him that further harassment 
would result in suspension or termination. Id. 
132. Id. at 883. An employee would have likely engaged in particularly egregious 
conduct for his mere presence to create a hostile work environment. Id. 
133. Id. at n.19. 
134. Id. On remand, the district court was instructed to determine whether 
Gray's mere presence would create a hostile environment for a reasonable woman. 
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 883. 
135. Id. at 883. The district court was instructed to explore the facts surround-
ing the government's decision to return Gray to San Mateo. Id. 
136. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991). See Scott, 798 F.2d at 
213; Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619. 
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that Title VII was not intended to bring about a "transformation 
of social mores .... "137 In fact, that is exactly what Congress 
intended in enacting Title VII, which is a remedial statute that 
is to be interpreted broadly to effectuate a fundamental change 
in the manner in which people interact in the workplace and, 
hopefully by extension, how they relate outside the work-
place. I3B 
There is, as well, another flaw in Scott and Rabidue which 
was not directly noted in Ellison. Both cases require a far 
higher showing of severity and pervasiveness than the EEOC 
Guidelines. I39 Indeed, Rabidue itself states that while courts 
may give "favorable consideration" to the Guidelines, they 
"are intra-agency suggested interpretative regulations that are 
not binding on the courts. "140 While it may be that the 
Guidelines are not binding, Meritor makes plain that in sexual 
harassment cases, the Guidelines are to be accorded consid-
erable weight, not the mere cursory review afforded them by 
Rabidue. I41 
B. THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD IS CONSONANT WITH 
CONGRESS' INTENT TO OPEN THE WORKPLACE BY ELIMINATING BAR-
RIERS TO EMPLOYMENT CAUSED BY SEXUAL HARASSMENT. 
The Ninth Circuit's reasonable woman standard is not the 
radical departure that it might seem to be at first blush; it is 
instead, consonant with the development of hostile work 
environment law in other circuits. In 1986, the Sixth Circuit 
analyzed whether alleged sexual conduct would cause serious 
psychological damage from the perspective of the "reasonable 
person" in Rabidue. 142 However, for the first time in a judicial 
opinion,I43 Justice Keith suggested in dissent that the courts 
adopt the reasonable woman standard to analyze the severity 
137. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 621. 
138. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 454 F.2d 234, 238 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(3). Sexual conduct violates Title VII when it "has the 
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile of offensive working environment-. Id. 
140. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619 n.4. 
141. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
142. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 6ll, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) cert. denied 
481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
143. See Comment, Se%ual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment 
Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984) (Suggesting the adoption of the 
reasonable woman standard). 
17
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and pervasiveness of sexual harassment. 144 Justice Keith 
explained that the reasonable woman standard appropriately 
accounts for the gender-based divergence in views on appro-
priate sexual conduct. 146 
One year later, the Sixth Circuit used the "reasonable 
woman" standard in Yates v. AVCO Corporation. l46 The Court 
held that in the context of a constructive discharge claim147 
based on the sexual harassment of a female subordinate by a 
male supervisor, the facts must establish that the reasonable 
woman would have felt compelled to resign to state an action-
able claim.148 In a footnote, the court cited Justice Keith's dis-
sent and acknowledged that "men and women are vulnerable 
in different ways and offended by different behavior."149While 
the Sixth Circuit has not yet recognized the reasonable woman 
standard in the context of co-worker hostile environment 
claims, it has now recognized the reasonable woman's per-
spective in a related area of sexual harassment law. 
The following year, the First Circuit, in Lipsett v. University 
of Puerto Rico, 160 cited Justice Keith's dissent in holding that 
in determining whether sexual conduct is unwelcome, as 
required by Meritor, 161 courts must look to both the man's and 
woman's perspective. 162 The Lipsett court stated that only 
when courts consider both perspectives can they avoid "sus-
tain[ing] ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned 
by the offenders .... "163 Although Lipsett did not mandate the 
use of the reasonable woman perspective in determining 
whether harassment is severe or pervasive enough to create a 
144. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. 
146. 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). 
147. "A constructive discharge exists if 'working conditions would have been so 
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have 
felt compelled to resign'." Id. at 636-37 (quoting Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 
(6th Cir. 1982». 
148. ld. at 637. 
149. ld. at n.2 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 
1986) (Keith, J., dissenting». 
150. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). 
151. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). 
152. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898. But see Morgan v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 
901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990). The reasonable person standard determines whether con-
duct is actionably unwelcome and pervasive. Id. at 192·93. 
153. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., 
dissenting». 
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hostile work environment, Lipsett recognized the importance 
of the woman's perspective within hostile environment cases. 
In 1990, the Third Circuit mandated the use of a "reason-
able person of the same sex in that position" standard to deter-
mine whether alleged conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to state a claim under Title VII. 164 The Court explained that the 
gender-based standard protects employers from undue liabil-
ity at the hands of hyper-sensitive employees, while "removing 
the walls of discrimination that deprive women of self-respect-
ing employment. "166 The Third Circuit's standard is directly 
analogous to Ellison's reasonable woman standard in that it is 
gender-based, objective and recognizes the impact of the dis-
parate perspectives held by men and women concerning appro-
priate sexual conduct. 166 
Several other courts have recently adopted the victim ori-
ented standard. In a case decided less than two months after 
Ellison, the district court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc. 167mandated the use of the reasonable woman stan-
dard in determining whether conduct supports a hostile work 
environment claim. l68 The Court reasoned that the "standard 
assessing the psychological harm resulting from harassment 
must begin to reflect women's sensitivity to behavior once 
condoned as acceptable. "169 On the same day, another district 
court decided Austen v. State of Hawaii, 160 which followed 
Ellison in finding that the plaintiff's supervisor referred to her 
in a manner that a reasonable woman would find typical of 
males who consider women inferior. 161 A few weeks later, anoth-
er district court cited Ellison in Harris v. International Paper 
Co. 162 The Harris court held that the appropriate standard to 
154. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990). 
155. [d. 
156. [d. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
157. 760 F. Supp. 1486, (M.D. Fla. 1991). 
158. [d. at 1524. A reasonable woman would find that a hostile work environment 
existed where sexual jokes and sexually oriented pictures of women were common and 
where co-workers rejected women in a non-sexual manner simply because they were 
women. [d. 
159. [d. at 1526 (quoting Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards 
in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1737-38 (1989». 
160. 759 F. Supp. 612 (D. Haw. 1991). 
161. [d. at 628. Austen showed impermissible sex discrimination and retaliation 
against her for her support of women's issues and for filing an EEOC complaint. [d. 
at 629. 
162. 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Me. 1991). 
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apply in determining whether harassment on the basis of race 
is sufficiently severe and pervasive to violate Title VII is that 
of a reasonable black person. 163 The Court held that "[t]he dif-
ferent social experiences of men and women in the case of 
sexual harassment, and of white Americans and black 
Americans in the case of racial harassment" must be considered 
to give "full force" to Title VII's concern with the consequences 
of discrimination. 1M The legal evolution of hostile work envi-
ronment claims displays the movement toward a solidification 
of the reasonable woman's perspective in determining the via-
bility of hostile workplace sexual harassment claims; Ellison 
is in accord with this trend. 
These cases reflect the fact that Congress intended Title VII 
to remove "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to 
employment."166 The principal barrier to employment for a 
woman is the knowledge that she will or may be subjected to 
an unpleasant or degrading atmosphere in the workplace. 
The point of Title VII is to allow women to obtain "self-respect-
ing employment. "166 In order to ensure that goal is reached, the 
perspective of the person whose self-respect is at issue must log-
ically be the focus. 
Again, however, and as every court that has enunciated the 
standard has stated, it is not just any woman's perspective, but 
the "reasonable" woman's perspective that must be applied. 
This is necessary to prevent employers from being subjected to 
liability for claims by "hyper-sensitive" employees. 167 However, 
in considering the "hyper-sensitive" person defense, courts 
should take care to avoid the presumption indulged in by 
some that any woman entering a certain type of workplace 
should expect the atmosphere to be "rough hewn" and the 
workplace to be filled with "sexual jokes, sexual conversa-
tions and girlie magazines."168 Indeed, correcting that atti-
tude may well be the most important effect of adopting the 
"reasonable woman" standard. 
163. [d. at 1516. "The appropriate standard to be applied in hostile environment 
harassment cases is that of a reasonable person from the protected group of which the 
alleged victim is a member." [d. at n.12. 
164. [d. at 1515. 
165. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971). 
166. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
167. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. 
168. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 621·22. 
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Even well-intentioned comments made to members of the 
opposite sex may amount to sex discrimination because Title 
VII is not concerned with the motivation behind conduct, but 
is instead "aimed at the consequences or effects of an employ-
ment practice."169 Employers and employees alike must be sen-
sitized to the reasonable woman's view of appropriate sexual 
conduct in the workplace. 17o The Ninth Circuit's use of the 
reasonable woman standard to determine whether sexual con-
duct supports an actionable hostile work environment claim 
promotes a sensitization of the work force and encourages an 
understanding of "what conduct offends reasonable members 
of the other sex"171 in line with the intent behind Title VII. 
c. ELLISON'S EMPLOYER LIABILITY STANDARDS ENCOURAGE 
SENSITIZATION OF THE WORK FORCE 
Like the reasonable woman standard, Ellison's employer lia-
bility standards are not radical departures from existing law 
and also encourage a sensitization of the work force. Employers 
on notice of co-worker sexual harassment must take prompt and 
appropriate remedial action to avoid Title VII liability.172 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the standard announced by the 
Fourth Circuit in Katz that employer remedies must be "rea-
sonably calculated to end the harassment. "173 This standard has 
been widely acceptedl74 and also supports Title VII's goal of pro-
viding a discrimination-free workplace. 
Ellison added to the standard announced in Katz by requir-
ing employers to "impose sufficient penalties to assure a work-
place free from sexual harassment. "176 To reach this goal, an 
employer's response must not just correct the specific problem, 
but it must do so in a way that deters others from engaging in 
such conduct.176 Even in this respect, Ellison is not a significant 
169. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. 
at 431). Additionally, 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(3) prohibits conduct that "has the pur· 
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or cre-
ating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." (emphasis added). 
170. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. 
171. [d. at 881. 
172. See infra note 97. 
173. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 
1983». 
174. E.g., Paroline v. UNISYS Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989); Barrett 
v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984). 
175. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. 
176. [d. 
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departure from existing case law. It has been held that "Title 
VII requires more than a mere request to refrain from dis-
criminatory conduct."177 Further, the courts have also sup-
ported employer responses to sexual harassment, even though 
they may go beyond that necessary to simply end the harass~ 
ment by the person engaging in it.178 Title VII's goal of discrimi-
nation-free working environments is greatly furthered by 
Ellison's requirement that employer responses to sexual harass-
ment assure a harassment-free workplace through both end-
ing the particular harassment and preventing future 
harassment through deterrent penalties. 
D. ELLISON'S MERE PRESENCE STANDARD AND TRADITIONAL 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION LAW 
Ellison's requirement that employers remove from the 
workplace an employee whose mere presence would create a 
hostile work environment to the reasonable woman is the 
holding with potentially the greatest import for both employ-
ers and employees. Again, however, it is not a significant 
change in existing law so much as a clarification of it. Firings 
were often upheld in pre-Ellison wrongful termination suits 
brought against employers who discharged employees for 
engaging in sexual harassment. At common law, such termina-
tions were usually upheld where the offender repeatedly and 
severely harassed other employees. 179 In labor arbitration 
suits,180 repeated incidents of sexual harassment usually war-
ranted termination of the harasser. 181 Also at common law, 
employers were not required to tolerate a hostile work 
177. DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 805 n.5 (1st Cir. 1980). See Ellison, 924 
F.2d at 882. 
178. E.g., Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984). 
179. See, e.g., Carosella v. United States Postal Serv., 806 F.2d 638, 643 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (Termination proper where offender repeatedly asked out and engaged in 
offensive touching); Williams v. Secretary of State, Merit Comm'n, 502 N.E.2d 770, 
774-75 (4th Dist. 1987) (Termination upheld where offender used vulgar language, 
made suggestive noises and tried to touch employee's breast and buttocks). 
180. See generally CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE, 417-20 (1990) for discussion oflabor arbitration suits against employers for 
the termination of harassers. 
181. See, e.g., United Elec. Supply Co. and Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local I, 
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921 (1984) (Termination proper where harasser warned and sev-
erallater testified against him); IBP, Inc. and United Food Workers Int'l Union Local 
222,89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 411 (1987) (Termination upheld where harasser repeated-
ly harassed co-worker at work and home and did not obtain employer- ordered 
counseling). 
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environment; the employee's conduct only needed to be likely 
to adversely affect the functioning of the workplace. 182 
The significance of Ellison is that it appears to require 
removal, as opposed to merely allowing that as an option, if the 
offender's mere presence would be an ongoing source of dis-
comfort for a reasonable woman who had previously suffered 
at the hands of the offender. Again, by incorporating the rea-
sonable woman standard, Ellison does more than just encour-
age sensitization of employers to the problems faced by women 
in the workplace. That goal is balanced with the need to assure 
employers that they will not be forced to remove otherwise valu-
able employees because of problems that reflect personality con-
flicts arising from individual idiosyncracies rather than the 
kind of gender directed hostility with which Title VII is 
concerned. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ellison is not, in the final analysis, a radical departure in 
Title VII law. It is but the clearest statement yet of the evolv-
ing approach to sexual harassment claims and Title VII cases 
generally. In Meritor, the Supreme Court recognized hostile 
work environment cases which do not require the direct, 
adverse economic impact on the plaintiff found in quid pro quo 
cases. From this decision, it is a short and logical step to 
Ellison's conclusion that the plaintiff in a hostile workplace case 
need not have suffered direct, adverse and severe psycho-
logical injury to state a claim. 
The Ellison court's adoption of the 'reasonable victim' test 
is likewise a sound step in Title VII case law. It recognizes that 
such standards are necessary to effectuate the Congressional 
intent behind Title VII, which was and is the elimination of not 
just blatant discrimination but of the subtle yet daunting bar-
riers that have prevented whole classes of persons from even 
trying to enter the workplace. It is only by viewing the work-
place environment from the victim's perspective that employ-
ers can understand and begin to correct those problems. Such 
employer sensitization is the necessary first step in eliminat-
ing the conduct that has kept women and other minorities 
182. Carosella, 816 F.2d at 643 (quoting Mings v. Department of Justice, 813 F.2d 
384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1987». 
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from fully participating in, and contributing to, the economic 
life of the nation. 
Finally, Ellison's standards for employer liability are sim-
ply recognition that a sensitized employer alone is not enough; 
employees, too, need to understand the impact that their 
behavior has, and that what they perceive as innocent fun 
can in fact be emotionally damaging. Ellison requires employ-
ers to use the tools available to them, education and discipline, 
to the fullest extent necessary to carry out the mission of Title 
VII: a transformation in the way that individuals deal with each 
other in the workplace. 
Sheryl Hahn* 
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